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1 Introduction 
Freedom of expression faces many challenges in Zimbabwe.  
 
Public expressions are affected by a variety of pieces of legislation in combination with 
official practices. Legislation on insult and defamation is assumed to have a particular 
chilling effect on public expressions. However, we see that the compliance with these laws 
is far from absolute, indicating that the effect of the legislation is conditional. But what is 
the effect of the legislation, and what are the factors that make legislation chilling? 
 
This study examines the effect that legislation on insult and defamation has on media prac-
titioners and artists in Zimbabwe. The detailed research question is: How is the Zimbabwe-
an legislation regarding insult laws and criminal defamation of public officials affecting 
critical voices (media, artists) – in which way can it be said that the legislation has a 
‘chilling effect’ on public expressions?   
 
In answering this question I have interviewed journalists, editors, artists and scholars in 
Zimbabwe. I will look at factors that have an impact on the deterring effect of legislation 
and apply these theories to the data from Zimbabwe.  
 
This study will contribute to three different fields. First of all, it is a contribution to the 
growing literature on the situation in Zimbabwe when it comes to freedom of expression 
and freedom of the media. Although many reports from non-governmental and internation-
al organisations document the chilling on the media in Zimbabwe, I have not found aca-
demic studies looking at this specifically. Secondly, I hope to contribute to the understand-
ing of what is meant by the chilling effect on the media within socio-legal studies; and 
thirdly, the study will also contribute to the more general question of which factors cause 
legislation to be effective.  
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1.1 Methodology 
The main thrust of my data comes from interviews performed during a two week field visit 
to Harare in March/April 2014, combined with literature studies of already existing books, 
articles and reports. One of the advantages of doing personal interviews is that the re-
searcher can get targeted information on the subject that he or she wants to learn more 
about. In this case, performing interviews also provided an opportunity to examine the ef-
fect of recent legal changes, which was relevant for my study. Also, issues related to free-
dom of expression and oppositional voices are complex in Zimbabwe, and in such a tense 
political situation the advantage of doing personal interviews is that people will feel more 
comfortable to talk about sensitive issues.  
 
All the interview objects were promised anonymity in the published thesis. This was im-
portant to some of them, whereas others said that they did not mind being quoted, since 
they had already talked publically about these or related issues. All names were still kept 
confidential, to avoid that someone could be identified by them having had a meeting with 
me and not being among those named
1
. Rumours about surveillance and infiltration of 
work places, universities etc. are constant in Zimbabwe, and it is very easy to get caught up 
in the habit of constantly looking over your shoulder to see if anyone is following you or 
listening to you. One of the informants put it this way:  
 
The CIO
2
 is the matter, although not as sophisticated as people are made to 
think, from my experience, but they play their role, sniffing out, they have to 
know that you are here, probably they do. They probably know that you are 
talking to me now.                               (Interview nr 2, Journalist 25.03.2014)   
 
This was said on my second day in Harare, which made it quite unlikely that the CIO 
should have any knowledge about me being there, but even so it illustrates the constant 
                                                 
 
1
 The list of names and contact information of all informants is kept by author.  
2
 Central Intelligence Organisation.  
 3 
feeling of being under surveillance that affects the everyday of many Zimbabweans and 
that also affected the data gathering.  
 
The majority of the interviews were semi-structured, based on an interview guide
3
 that 
served as a check list during the interview, which lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. In 
total there were 12 full interviews which were recorded and transcribed afterwards, and two 
informal interviews (the latter two were not recorded). The list of interviews is included in 
the table of reference. The interview subjects were not randomly sampled, but chosen be-
cause they had special knowledge on the situation (such as human rights lawyers working 
with defamation or scholars with specific knowledge on the situation) and because they had 
been referred to me due to their work as journalists and/or editors who had faced defama-
tion charges. This is known as ‘purposive sampling’, whereby the selection process is guid-
ed by the study’s purpose and the researcher’s knowledge of the population (Tansey 
2007:770). Some interview subjects were referred by other informants, so-called ‘snowball 
sampling’ (ibid). This kind of sampling necessarily creates a bias in the data gathered. Al-
so, the number of people interviewed is very limited. In order to compensate for this, I have 
triangulated the data gathering methodology by combining the interviews of such primary 
sources with elite interviewing of human rights lawyers, media experts and scholars in ad-
dition to literature review. The different background of the interview subjects made it pos-
sible to double check information given by other informants and also to check some of the 
working hypothesis along the way. One of the characteristics of informal interviews is that 
data gathering and data analysis is a parallel process (Grønmo 2004:159). Some of the in-
formants became both primary and secondary sources; primary sources on their own lived 
experience as journalists and public intellectuals, and secondary sources on the general 
picture, based on their research or professionally acquired knowledge on the situation.  
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 Different interview guides were used depending on the informant’s status.  
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The biggest methodological challenge for this study is to identify and separate the effects 
caused by legislation and the effects caused by other factors. A society is not a laboratory 
where you can isolate some factors, and there is always an interrelationship between legis-
lation, policies and politics and social factors, to mention some. However, the intention is 
not to identify all the factors that have an impact on freedom of expression. What I set out 
to do is to look at the Zimbabwean legislation in light of theories on what makes laws de-
terring, in order to define the degree of chilling that the legislation can be said to make. The 
recent legal changes in Zimbabwe, with a new Constitution and recent rulings by the Con-
stitutional Court (in late 2013 and early 2014) gives a methodological advantage, since the 
changes creates a before-and-after scenario that can make it easier to identify the effects of 
the legislation per se. I will return to the details of these recent events below. 
 
1.2 Outline of the thesis – a reader’s guide 
This thesis is divided in four main chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter, introduc-
ing the area of research and explaining the research question and methodology. Chapter 2 
gives the theoretical background for the study. Here I will present the human rights frame-
work on freedom of expression and some background on defamation and insult laws. I then 
move on to present relevant theories on the chilling effect and on the factors causing legis-
lation to have a deterring effect, and discuss how this theory can be applied to the data from 
Zimbabwe. Chapter 3 is the main chapter of the study. The first part of the chapter is an 
introduction to the situation in Zimbabwe, focusing on the relevant legislation and context 
for this study. I then present the data collected, and apply the aforementioned theories in a 
discussion on the effects of the legislation on public expressions by the media and artists. 
Chapter 4 is a summary of the conclusions.  
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2 Freedom of expression, defamation laws and the ‘chilling 
effect’ 
Before I move on to analyse the findings in Zimbabwe, it is necessary to present the theo-
retical framework that will be applied. In this chapter I will start by giving a brief presenta-
tion of the provisions on freedom of expression in international human rights law. I then 
examine the theoretical background on what is meant by the ‘chilling effect’ in relation to 
freedom of expression, and especially regarding criminal defamation or so-called “insult 
laws”. Finally I will present theories regarding the effects of criminal law on behaviour and 
the factors determining the compliance of rules, and show how these theories can be ap-
plied in my analysis to gain more understanding of the effect of Zimbabwean legislation. 
2.1 Freedom of expression in international human rights law 
Freedom of expression is a recognized human right enshrined in several regional and inter-
national instruments. The most important ones are the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) article 19, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) article 10, the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ACHR) article 13 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Banjul Charter) article 9. Freedom of expression is however not an unlimited right; it can 
be legitimately restricted in certain areas where freedom of expression comes into conflict 
with other rights or with other legitimate concerns of the authorities. The legitimate re-
strictions are often specified in the provisions.  
 
Due to the wide-spread ratification of the ICCPR,
 4
 its provisions in article 19 are the most 
widely recognized human rights provisions on freedom of expression. Article 19(3) states 
that the exercise of the rights within the article carries both duties and responsibilities and 
may therefore be subject to some restrictions. In order to avoid the abuse of limitations on 
freedom of speech, any limitation must be clearly defined and provided by law. Limitations 
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 168 countries have ratified the ICCPR as of May 2014 (UN 2014). 
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should not jeopardize the exercise of the right itself, they must be necessary and propor-
tionate to the objective they seek to achieve and should include the least intrusive means 
possible, to prevent a chilling effect (La Rue 2009:para 40). Article 20 of the ICCPR fur-
ther limits the freedom of expression, stating that propaganda for war shall be prohibited by 
law, and the same goes for any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that consti-
tutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.  
 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC), which has been given the task of monitoring the 
implementation of the ICCPR, has made a general comment on Article 19, General com-
ment 34 (GC34).
5
 Here the HRC states that a reservation to article 19 is not compatible 
with the object and the purpose of the covenant (HRC 2011, GC 34:para5), thereby show-
ing the importance of freedom of speech for the Covenant as a whole. They also specify the 
strong restrictions on the limitations provided for in subsection 3 of article 19, and include 
a section on “Limitative scope of restrictions on freedom of expression in certain specific 
areas” (paras.37-49) and on the relationship between articles 19 and 20 (paras.50-52). Here 
they touch upon some debated areas where freedom of expression can come into conflict 
with other rights, such as blasphemy, defamation and privacy, and hate speech (inciting 
discrimination). The general comment also discusses the role of the media. The HRC states 
that all restrictions on freedom of expression must be in line with subsection 3 of article 19. 
In the jurisprudence of the HRC, both as shown in General Comment 34 and in their vari-
ous rulings regarding alleged violations of article 19, we see that the HRC has a strict inter-
pretation of which limitations state parties can legally put on freedom of expression. I will 
come back to what HRC says on defamation and insult laws in the following section. 
 
2.2 Criminal defamation and “insult laws” 
Most, if not all, countries have some kind of defamation or libel laws, to ensure that indi-
viduals are protected against wrongful public allegations against them. The protection 
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 GC34 replaced GC10.  
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against wrongful public accusations is also granted in human rights instruments. However, 
many countries go even further in protecting against insults or defamation, through some 
kind of “insult laws”. Insult laws differ a lot between countries and regions, but the essence 
of these laws is to criminalize expressions that are perceived as insulting or can be said to 
cause disrespect, offend or undermine the honour and dignity of authorities or public offi-
cials. In 2002 over 100 countries had such laws (Walden 2002:207). A number of countries 
have repealed such legislation since then, but McCracken (2012) documented examples 
from 59 countries in 2010.  Although some countries have general laws that also cover ex-
pressions made about other individuals, high-ranking government officials, civil servants 
and politicians are the ones who invoke these laws the most (Walden 2002:207). Zimbabwe 
is one of the countries that also have general provisions on criminal insult and criminal 
defamation (sections 95 and 96 of the Criminal law (codification and reform) Act – hereaf-
ter referred to as the Criminal Code). The Zimbabwean legislation is examined in detail in 
chapter 3.  
 
Insult laws are often considered part of criminal defamation laws, but there are some fac-
tors distinguishing between insult and defamation. Defamation legislation is designed to 
help people protect their reputation against libel (written defamation) or slander (oral def-
amation), and is concerned with the impact such expressions have on third parties (the pub-
lic), whereas insult laws are concerned with the impact such expressions have on the feel-
ings of the insulted person, on his or her honour and dignity (Walden 2002:208). This 
means that you will be freed from charges of criminal defamation if you can prove that the 
allegations are true, but this does not go for insult charges, as long as one can claim that the 
allegations or expressions undermined the dignity of the ‘insulted’ person. In addition, ex-
pressions of opinion are usually not legally actionable as defamation, whereas insult legis-
lation can also cover truthful allegations, opinions, satire etc. (ibid:208). However, it is 
important to note that the distinctions between defamation and insult can sometimes be 
blurred in practice, and vaguely defined libel laws can lead to defamation convictions 
where the expressions uttered are in fact insults or disrespect (ibid:209).  
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2.2.1 Historical background 
The roots of general insult laws can be traced as far back as the fifth century Roman Law 
of the Twelve Tablets’ provisions on iniuria (Walden 2000:9), but the insult laws regarding 
heads of state and authorities come from the notion of lèse majesté, which meant an of-
fence to the dignity of the sovereign (Ottaway and Marks 2000:1). Since the King was 
thought of as being ruler by divine right, these laws were related to blasphemy (ibid). Many 
monarchies still have lèse majesté-laws protecting members of the royal family, and some 
Islamic nations have blasphemy laws that mandates severe penalties for insulting religious 
leaders (Walden 2000:7). When the rulers of most states became presidents such laws 
changed into the protection of presidents or other authorities from insults. The classic form 
of these laws is the French press law of 1881, which has been replicated in various forms in 
a range of other countries (ibid). The modern insult laws are related to laws regarding ‘se-
ditious libel’ in the old British common law; a law that was developed after the introduc-
tion of the printing press (ibid:9). Insult laws in African countries today are mostly a colo-
nial legacy (Balule 2009:408), and many former British colonies still have laws criminaliz-
ing seditious libel.  
 
This is the case in Zimbabwe, which inherited insult laws in the form of sedition laws from 
Britain in the now repealed Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1960 (Balule 2009:425).  
In current legislation, we find these laws in the Criminal Code, section 31 on “Publishing 
or communication false statements prejudicial to the State” and section 33 on “Undermin-
ing authority of or insulting President”, which are the ones examined in this study. 
 
2.2.2 Insult laws and freedom of expression 
There is a fear that insult and defamation legislation can undermine the free public expres-
sion of opinions and ideas, and the media’s possibility to disseminate opinions and to hold 
the government accountable. Insult laws are perceived by many as being especially harm-
ing to democratic rights in a country. As Walden (2002:207) puts it:  
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Regardless of what the laws are called or how they are worded, the result is 
the same: they are used to stifle and punish political discussion and dissent, 
editorial comment and criticism, satire, and investigative journalism. They 
constitute one of the most pervasive, repressive, and dangerous forms of me-
dia regulation.   
 
Criminal defamation and insult laws are widely used to stifle legitimate criticism of gov-
ernment institutions and public officials, and there is widespread use of such laws in coun-
tries facing political crisis or civil conflict (Balule 2009:406). Due to such abuse of insult 
laws all the major human rights bodies have acknowledged the need to be cautious with 
such legislation to ensure that it does not come in conflict with democratic principles of 
transparency and public scrutiny of government and public officials (ibid:410-411). The 
African Commission on Human Rights has adopted Resolution 169 on Repealing Criminal 
Defamation Laws in Africa, where they express their “concern at the deteriorating press 
freedom in some parts of Africa, and in particular: restrictive legislations that censor the 
public’s right to access information; direct attacks on journalists; their arrest and detention; 
physical assault and killings, due to statements or materials published against government 
officials” (ACHR 2010). The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information in Africa, Commissioner Pansy Tlakula, is also appealing to African states to 
abolish laws that restrict freedom of expression, and has launched a campaign for this pur-
pose (Shyllon 2012:9). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) states 
in its Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, article 11, that insult laws 
(known in Latin America as ‘desacato laws’) “restrict freedom of expression and the right 
to information” (OAS 2000). 
 
In Europe, the Council of Europe’s Declaration on Freedom of Political Debate in the Me-
dia does not declare insult laws a violation of freedom of expression per se, but urges gov-
ernments to apply protection of government institutions, where such protection exists, in a 
restrictive manner (Balule 2009:411). The European Court on Human Rights has also lim-
ited the discretion of governments in defamation cases involving politicians, stressing that 
politicians should have to accept more criticism than private individuals (Kozlowski 
2006:141-142). 
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The former Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo, also urged states to decriminalize defamation in 
his report to the Human Rights Council in 2007 (Ligabo 2007: paras44-57). 
 
The Human Rights Committee states their concern regarding laws that criminalize defama-
tion of heads of states and urges states to consider decriminalization in General Comment 
34 (HRC 2011, GC 34, paras 38 and 47). Paragraph 38 says: 
 
Moreover, all public figures, including those exercising the highest political 
authority such as heads of state and government, are legitimately subject to 
criticism and political opposition.
 
Accordingly, the Committee expresses 
concern regarding laws on such matters as, lese majesty,
 
desacato,
 
disrespect 
for authority,
 
disrespect for flags and symbols, defamation of the head of 
state
 
and the protection of the honour of public officials, and laws should not 
provide for more severe penalties solely on the basis of the identity of the 
person that may have been impugned. (GC 34:38)  
 
 
They have also commented on these issues in their concluding observations on state par-
ties’ reports, such as the concluding observations on Zambia in 2007. Here the HRC states 
their concern that defamation against the president is still a criminal offence, and that ar-
rests and charges are used “as harassment and censorship techniques” against journalists 
who publicize articles that are critical of the Government (HRC 2007:para19). The HRC 
has also commented on this issue in the consideration of an individual communication un-
der the Optional Protocol. In Adonis v. The Philippines, the HRC, referring to GC 34, con-
cluded that the Philippines had violated article 19(3) by convicting Mr. Adonis for defama-
tion. Since Zimbabwe has not ratified the first additional protocol to the ICCPR, the HRC 
has not dealt with any individual complaints regarding the legislation of Zimbabwe, but the 
general comments, although not legally binding, give instructions on the interpretation of 
the Covenant that should be followed by all ratifying states. 
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2.3 The ‘chilling effect’ 
As mentioned above, there are many voices of concern regarding the stifling effect that 
libel and defamation laws can have on public debate and democratic principles in a coun-
try. This concern is especially strong regarding the media, and many human rights, legal 
and media commentators argue that defamation laws or libel laws ‘chill’ media speech 
(Dent and Kenyon 2004:1).
6
 Before I proceed with analysing the situation in Zimbabwe in 
more detail, I will discuss the concept of ‘chilling effect’ to give a theoretical background 
that will enable us to assess the effect of the legislation in Zimbabwe.  
2.3.1 The legal concept 
The idea of something having a ‘chilling’ effect implies that it deters someone from doing 
something they otherwise would have done. The reasons behind why people act as they do 
are complicated, and legislation is but one of the factors that frame our behaviour. Howev-
er, in law we can say that the deterring factor is the fear of punishment, whether this pun-
ishment is imprisonment, fines or other sanctions (Schauer 1978:689). Related to freedom 
of expression, the ‘chilling effect’ is when the media or individuals impose a self-
censorship on what they say or publish in fear of being criminally charged (Steiner, Alston 
and Goodman 2007:654). You can distinguish between the direct chilling effect, which is 
when expressions are specifically altered due to legal considerations, and a structural 
chilling effect, which works in a more subtle manner, preventing the creation of certain 
kind of material or mentioning certain issues (Barendt 1997:191-192).    
 
As a legal concept, the term ‘chilling effect’ is of US origin, developed by the Supreme 
Court in various cases regarding free speech and libel laws (Barendt 1997:189-190). The 
first mentioning of the concept by the Supreme Court in a First amendment case was in 
1963.
7
 In this legal context, the ‘chilling effect’ refers to “the effect of the rules of law, 
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 “While, of course, all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these provisions, they are all the more 
essential here, where the challenged privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their 
 12 
whether criminal or civil, and of official practices on the exercise of freedom of speech and 
of the media” (Barendt 1997:190). Whereas administrative censorship and court injunctions 
will have an immediate and straightforward effect in preventing publication or other ex-
pressions, the fear of criminal or civil prosecution can have a chilling effect deterring peo-
ple from publishing a story or making an expression even in the cases where they could 
have been able to defend the action if prosecuted (ibid). This means that the chilling effect 
refers to the deterrence of activities and expressions that are in fact protected by either the 
national constitution or by international human rights provisions, due to the fear of prose-
cutions. In other words, “[t]he danger of this sort of invidious chilling effect lies in the fact 
that something that ‘ought’ to be expressed is not. Deterred by the fear of punishment, 
some individuals refrain from saying or publishing that which they lawfully could, and 
indeed, should”(Schauer 1978:693).  
 
The danger of chilling speech and expressions that are lawful is an argument for avoiding 
broad and vague legal provisions, and also for not narrowing down the scope of lawful ex-
pressions, since the most difficult expressions to judge the legality of are the expressions 
that lie on the borders between legal and illegal (ibid:696). Implicit here is notion that it is 
more harmful to wrongfully limit expressions than to overextend them, since the harm to 
society is considered graver by the first than by the latter. Where this is probably most 
clearly expressed is in the US legal tradition, where the ‘chilling effect doctrine’ has 
evolved “into a major substantive component of first amendment adjudication”(Schauer 
1978:685). Here the fear of unintended chilling of speech has opened up for an extensive 
and broad legal interpretation of the freedom of speech provision in the first amendment.    
 
It is important to note that a deterring effect is an intended effect behind legislation and 
regulations (Schauer 1978:689); they are in fact designed to regulate people’s behaviour, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
neighbors and the deterrent and ‘chilling’ effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of 
free speech, expression, and association is consequently the more immediate and substantial” (Gibson v. 
Florida Legis. Investigation Comm, 372  U.S. 539, 556-57,1963 (referred to in Schauer 1978:685)  
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whether it is to make us not drive past the speeding limit, refrain from violently attacking 
other citizens or from cheating on our taxes. In this sense, legislation in itself is intended to 
have a ‘chilling effect’. This also affects freedom of expression, for instance where legisla-
tion makes it illegal to publish certain forms of pornography, thus restricting people’s abil-
ity to legally publish such expressions. Frederick Schauer labels this intended effect as a 
“benign chilling effect” (1978:690). He also underlines that all restrictions will in fact run 
the risk of deterring someone from doing something that the regulation does not intend to 
deter (ibid:700-701), which is a non-benign effect. In other words, any law used for its 
original purpose will have an intended chilling effect that is to deter people from violating 
the provision provided in the law, but is also at the risk of having an unintended chilling 
effect by deterring people from doing something that will in fact not violate the provision 
in the law.  
 
2.3.2 What determines the chilling effect of legislation?  
Above I have discussed how legislation can have a chilling effect, both intended and unin-
tended. But what determines when people abide by the rules and when they ignore them? 
In this section I will present the theoretical framework that I will use in the analysis of the 
effects that insult and defamation legislation has on public expressions in Zimbabwe, com-
bining the theories regarding the chilling effect with theories on the factors that determine 
the deterring effect of legislation.  
 
There is a lot of literature in criminology, law and philosophy on the variables that deter-
mine the effects of legislation and the compliance with rules. I will not explore this subject 
in full detail, but have chosen to limit the presentation to what is relevant for my analysis.  
 
First of all, it is of course necessary to distinguish between rules that are legally enforced, 
for example by legal sanctions, and rules and norms that are only socially enforced, where 
the ‘offender’ might experience social sanctions but that are not illegal per se. Often these 
are related; people who commit acts such as theft and murder face the risk of facing both 
legal and social sanctions, and people’s attitudes towards certain activities are also shaped 
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by legislation and vice-versa (there are for example several studies on the interrelationship 
between attitudes and legislation regarding smoking).
 8
 However, the factors that determine 
compliance will have similarities regardless of what kind of rules we are talking about. If a 
rule is to deter people from breaking it, there are three prerequisites that must be satisfied: 
The rule must be known to the possible offender; the perceived costs of violating the rule 
must be considered to be higher than the perceived benefits; and the person must be able 
and willing to let this knowledge decide his or her conduct at the time of the potential vio-
lation (Robinson and Darley 2003:953), meaning that he or she is able and willing to act 
rationally at the time.  
 
These three prerequisites are only at the top of a complex dynamic process, and I will elab-
orate a little bit on each of them to show some of the complexities. Knowledge of the rule 
in question seems like an easy prerequisite to satisfy. However, the detailed knowledge of 
the contents of legislation can be quite limited, and people often have a tendency to assume 
that the law is as it should be, according to their perception of justice (ibid:952).
9
 Also, 
even given that there is knowledge about the rule in question, the deterrence effect of this 
rule would depend on, among other factors, that the people targeted by the rule are rational 
and able to act rationally in the given circumstances; that there is a high chance of detec-
tion; and that there is a reasonable certainty of punishment after detection (ibid:976). Stud-
ies show that the likelihood of being detected is the most important factor in this deterrence 
equation, more important than the severity of the punishment (Zimring and Hawkins, cited 
in Kagan and Skolnick 1993:78). So if the risk of being caught is perceived as almost non-
existent, the prospects of strict punishment will not in itself be enough to deter people from 
committing an act that they want to commit. This will, of course, depend on the context, 
and on the degrees of severity. If the possible punishment is life threatening or extreme in 
other ways, this can have a deterring impact even in situations where the probability of 
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 See for instance Rabin and Sugarman (1993).  
9
 Probably this applies most to countries where the population perceives that there is rule of law and there is a 
general trust in the fairness of the laws.  
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being punished is limited. The perceived severity of the punishment is also determined by 
the time that passes between violation and sanction. If there is a long time laps, the per-
ceived cost will be dramatically reduced (Robinson and Darley 2003:954).  
 
The perceived benefit to be gained from the rule violation is of course central in the cost-
benefit analysis. If the benefits to be gained are quite limited, the cost factors will become 
more important.  
 
Another factor in the cost-benefit analysis that a (rational) person will perform is related to 
the social reactions that the act will lead to. This is of course related to individual context, 
such as social status, economic background etc. The cost of a criminal prosecution would 
be perceived differently depending on who the person is, whether he or she has a previous 
criminal record etc. The social support for the actions is also of crucial importance. People 
will more easily defy norms and rules if there is social support for their acts within their 
social group, even in situations with considerable risk of punishment (Kagan and Skolnick 
1993:78).  
 
This leads us to the last factor to consider, namely the ability and willingness of the poten-
tial offender to act rationally in the relevant circumstances. A rule or law will not in itself 
deter people who find themselves in circumstances where they cannot be expected to act 
rationally according to a cost-benefit analysis, for instance due to extreme stress, intoxica-
tion, illness or other factors.       
 
One factor is the ability to act rationally. The other factor is willingness. Determining the 
willingness to act rationally of course implies that the rational thing to do is to not break the 
law. However, if a law is considered unconstitutional or unjust, violating the law conscien-
tiously could also be a rational act of civil disobedience; a deliberate and rational act as a 
political protest to bring the issue to the attention of the public or with the aim of getting 
the issue before the courts by creating what is referred to as a test case (Hall 2007:2085-86, 
Olsen 2005:213). In this case, the rule violation is considered the rational thing to do by the 
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offender. Many people will find it easier to violate a law if they consider it to be unconsti-
tutional as well as unjust (Olsen 2005:217), and the support from the public is much easier 
to get if you have good arguments that the law in question is unconstitutional (ibid:222). In 
fact, some people do not even consider it to be civil disobedience if the law that is being 
violated is unconstitutional (ibid:213).
10
 Anyway, we see that the possible deterring factor 
of a rule or law is a lot weaker if the rule in question is perceived as being illegitimate or 
unjust, and especially if it is perceived as being unconstitutional. Also, if the issue is per-
ceived as being highly important to several people, the ability to organize and mobilize 
people in mutual support for anti-compliance would weaken the deterring effect of the law.  
 
If we are to determine the deterring, or chilling effect of a law or a rule, it is necessary to 
understand that such processes are very complex, dynamic and depending on context and 
individual circumstances. Even in situations that may seem similar, two people might as-
sess the perceived costs and benefits quite differently, due to individual differences and 
different assessment of the context. Individual factors that can increase (perceived) vulner-
ability are gender, age, socio-economic standing, ethnicity etc. Also, the degree of uncer-
tainty surrounding the situation will make the assessment more complicated.      
 
2.3.3 A theory of the chilling effect of Zimbabwean legislation 
Based on the theories I have presented above, what can we expect to find when we analyse 
the effects of the current legislation in Zimbabwe? If the legislation is supposed to have the 
intended chilling effect, which is to prevent people from making expressions that violate 
the law, there are some factors that need to be considered.  
 
                                                 
 
10
 Then of course the question is: who decides if a law is unconstitutional and how do you punish people who 
have acted in good faith doing what they believed to be in line with the Constitution? I will not go further into 
the debate on civil disobedience here, but see Hall (2007) for a proposal as to how criminal law can deal with 
civil disobedience through introducing a “Guilty but civilly disobedient” verdict.  
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First, if the legislation is to have a deterring effect on public voices, there must be 
knowledge about the law among people in the media and art world. On the other hand, the 
ability to evade the law would also depend on the knowledge of the laws in question. Lack 
of detailed knowledge could therefor increase the unintended chilling effect of the law.  
 
Second, the perceived costs of breaking the law must be higher than the perceived benefits 
that would come with a violation. To establish if this is the case, I must look at the factors 
related to costs and benefits, such as the probability of detection and a response from the 
authorities, the severity of the possible consequences and the time laps between a violation 
and the sanction. Sanctions could also apply to third parties such as family, friends or pro-
fessional relations. Given the special role of the media, professional media ethics require 
journalists and editors to take special care not to cause harm to third parties. This includes 
the protection of sources. I would therefor expect a cost-benefit analysis to include per-
ceived costs also for third parties. Given that these factors are important in establishing the 
deterring effect of a law, we can expect to see a change in behaviour due to the recent 
changes such as the provisions in the new constitution and the rulings by the Constitutional 
court regarding certain sections of the current legislation. We would also expect to see 
strategies to avoid detection, such as anonymity, and other ways of hiding violations.  
 
Ultimately I will look at the perceived legitimacy of the current legislation to assess wheth-
er it can be deemed rational and socially acceptable to violate the legislation, thereby in-
creasing the willingness to violate the law. Such willingness could reduce the deterring 
effect of the legislation. By analysing the data obtained in light of all these factors, hopeful-
ly we can approach a deeper understanding of the effect of legislation on public expres-
sions. 
 
One note of caution must be mentioned before I proceed with the analysis: In a politically 
polarized society such as Zimbabwe, all data must be analysed with extra care because the 
perceptions of the situation will vary depending on which side you identify with. There is 
also the possibility of issues being exaggerated or downplayed according to the political 
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(and personal) views of the informant, or of the state department or human rights organisa-
tion behind a report or study. Previous victimization, such as imprisonment or torture, or 
other individual experiences could also colour an informant’s perception of the government 
policies or practices even though he or she is interviewed as an expert. It is important that 
any researcher is aware of this, so that we don’t end up being mouth pieces for any one side 
of a conflict. I have tried to be aware of this throughout my work. 
 
3 The effect of legislation in Zimbabwe 
Before I proceed with presenting and analysing the data I have collected, I will give an in-
troduction to the situation in Zimbabwe when it comes to freedom of speech and media 
freedoms, and present the relevant legislation on insult and defamation. I will then present 
and analyse my findings in light of the theory presented above. 
3.1 Zimbabwe – introduction  
3.1.1 Zimbabwe and human rights 
Zimbabwe was established as an independent nation in 1980, putting an end to white mi-
nority-ruled Rhodesia led by Ian Smith. Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally declared itself 
independent from the former colonial ruler United Kingdom in 1965. The independence in 
1980 put an end to a civil war that had lasted for about a decade, and installed the leader of 
the independence movement, Robert Mugabe, as Prime Minister. Robert Mugabe remained 
Prime Minister until the Constitution was changed in 1987 and the head of state became the 
President (Vollan 2013:9). Since then, Robert Mugabe has been President of Zimbabwe, 
making him one of the longest serving heads of state in the world.  
 
Zimbabwe has ratified a number of the most significant human rights treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the 
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Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the 
Banjul Charter). They have not ratified the optional protocols to the ICCPR, the ICESCR 
or the CEDAW or article 14 of the CERD, nor have they ratified the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT).
11
 
 
Several Zimbabwean organisations report regular human rights violations within a wide 
range of areas. Alleged violations, especially regarding civil and political human rights, 
have increased in electoral processes, and politically motivated violence has been reported 
by many human rights organisations. The human rights situation has led to several Europe-
an countries and the United States imposing economic and political sanctions on Zimba-
bwe.
12
  
 
In 2013, Zimbabwe approved a new constitution, replacing the 1980 Lancaster house Con-
stitution. The new constitution was approved in a referendum in March 2013 and entered 
into force in May 2013. The country then turned directly to an election process, with elec-
tions being held on 31
st
 of July 2013. The elections ended the four years of co-ruling by the 
ZANU-PF and the two MDC-formations (Movement for Democratic Change, which was 
split in two factions in 2005)
13
 in the Government of National Unity (GNU). Although the 
election results are challenged by the MDC, the new ZANU-PF government took its seats 
in September 2013, headed by the then 89 years old President Robert Mugabe, and sup-
ported by a Parliament where ZANU-PF now holds a large majority. In fact, ZANU-PF 
                                                 
 
11
 The optional protocols and article 14 of CERD are individual complaints mechanisms.  
12
 There have been developments during the first months of 2014 to ease the sanctions. The issue of sanctions 
and their effects has been the source of much debate in Zimbabwe. 
13
 The Morgan Tsvangirai-faction MDC-T and the Arthur Mutambara-faction MDC-M (later led by Welsh-
man Ncube). The split came after the general elections in 2005, where ZANU-PF won a big enough majority 
to change the constitution and reintroduce the Senate. The MDC opposed this, but then split over whether or 
not they should participate in the elections for the senate (Vollan 2013:24). Currently (May 2014) there is the 
possibility of a further fractioning within MDC-T.  
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holds the sufficient two-thirds majority in both houses necessary to amend the Constitution 
if they should so desire.
14
  
 
The new constitution is considered as a better framework for protecting human rights than 
the previous constitution, especially since it has a quite progressive Bill of Rights. It also 
includes specific provisions on the protection of academic freedom and freedom of artistic 
expression, and freedom of the media, explicitly stating that this includes the protection of 
sources (§61). There is an ongoing debate in Zimbabwe on the process of realignment of 
existing legislation to the new constitution, both in parliament and in the media, and the 
estimate of how many laws that need to be changed as a result of the new constitution var-
ies from 100 to around 400, depending on the source. An inter-ministerial committee was 
set up in October 2013 to look at this issue (Sunday Mail 2013a), but the government is 
warning the public that the process might take a long time (Radio Dialogue 2014).  
 
3.1.2 Zimbabwean legislation affecting freedom of expression 
The traditional media environment in Zimbabwe consists of a relatively liberalized printed 
media and a state-dominated broadcasting sector (Chuma 2013:11). In addition there has 
been an increase in digital media and online publications during the last couple of years, 
most of them diaspora based; a development that has to some extent changed the media 
arena. I will return to this below. 
 
The most relevant legislation in Zimbabwe related to public expressions are the Public Or-
der and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 
(AIPPA), passed in 2002 and 2003 respectively, and Criminal law (codification and re-
form) Act (passed in 2005, entered into effect in 2006). The Zimbabwean government ex-
plained the reasoning behind introducing the AIPPA legislation in this way, in their period-
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 Requirement stated in §328 of the Constitution. Changes cannot be made to the Chapter 4 (which includes 
the bill of rights) or Chapter 16 (on agriculture and land) without a nationwide referendum being held first. 
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ic report to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights: “A highly disturbing 
development is that many of the private media organizations have been peddling deliberate 
falsehoods, which undermined the State and individual security in support of the British-
orchestrated strategy of ‘regime change’, thus compelling Government to enact the 
AIPPA” (Republic of Zimbabwe 2006:xxxiii). The Criminal Code was supposed to consol-
idate and amend the criminal law of Zimbabwe, and as part of that it took some of the most 
criticized provisions from POSA and AIPPA such as the insult and defamation clauses, and 
in some instances introduced harsher penalties (Open Societies Foundation 2009:30-31).  
 
Artists are affected by the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act, which sets down a 
Board of censors who shall make decisions regarding “undesirable” pieces of art, such as 
films, texts etc., and also prohibits all public entertainment unless it has been previously 
approved by the Board (section 16(1) of the Act). Other relevant acts regulating public ex-
pressions include the Postal and Telecommunications Act, the Broadcasting Services Act, 
the Official Secrets Act and the Interception of Communications Act. For a detailed presen-
tation of the content of the different pieces of legislation affecting the media, see Open So-
ciety Foundation (2009) or see MISA (undated) for an analysis of amendments to media 
laws after 2005. 
 
This study looks specifically at insult and defamation legislation. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, the Zimbabwean laws on defamation and insult of public officials are a colonial inher-
itance (Balule 2009:425). Today we find the actual legislation in the Criminal code, section 
31 on “Publishing or communication false statements prejudicial to the State” and section 
33 on “Undermining authority of or insulting Preside (see annex 6.1 and 6.2 for the full 
wording of the sections). Section 31 is mostly applied against journalists or editors, since it 
involves publications or communications, whereas section 33 can be applied towards any 
individual who says something insulting about the President (see chapter 2 for the differ-
ences between insult and defamation).  
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As early as May 2003, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe ruled that section 80 of the AIPPA 
– Abuse of journalistic privilege – was unconstitutional.15 The African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights also found section 80 of AIPPA to be incompatible with article 
9 in the Banjul Charter, in Scanlen & Holderness v. Zimbabwe. Section 80 of the AIPPA 
was repealed, but only because it reappeared in a very similar form in Section 31 of the 
Criminal Code, introducing a harsher penalty. 
 
The constitutionality of sections 31 and 33 of the Criminal Code has been questioned by 
the Supreme Court (sitting as the Constitutional Court) in two different cases in October 
2013. The Court declared both sections unconstitutional, but invited the State to present its 
arguments for sustaining the sections. The State presented its arguments on section 31 to 
the Constitutional court, but withdrew the charges in the case related to section 33, thereby 
avoiding the final judgement on the constitutionality of this section. The final ruling on 
section 31 is still to be made public (as of May 2014). According to a lawyer at Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights, who represented the defendant Owen Maseko in the section 
33-case, the state continued to withdraw charges in three more section 33-cases between 
January and April 2014, impeding the possibility of getting a final decision that could strike 
down the section as unconstitutional once and for all (Interview nr. 14, Human Rights law-
yer, 03.04.2014). It remains to be seen what will happen with these sections (as of May 
2014). Many of the informants expressed a lack of faith in the effect that the new constitu-
tion would have on the existing legislation, because of the government’s previous disregard 
of court decisions regarding constitutionality.
16
 
 
In addition to section 31 and 33, the Criminal Code also has a provision on criminal defa-
mation, section 96 (see Annex 6.3 for the full wording of this section). Criminal defamation 
charges are frequently being used against media, both journalists and editors, often by poli-
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 In the case of Zvakavpano Mudiwa v The State (Interights 2010:24). 
16
 There are at least 12 cases between 2000 and 2008 where the State ignored court rulings on various issues 
(Ginsberg and Moustafa 2008:253).  
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ticians. The defamation provisions is currently (May 2014) being challenged by many in 
Zimbabwean society, including Zinef - The Zimbabwe National Editors’ Forum (NewsDay 
2014a). The Information, Media and Broadcasting Services minister, Jonathan Moyo, has 
also made recent public statements saying that these laws will be repealed, and are proba-
bly unconstitutional: 
 
Even so, I am happy to say without any equivocation and without any fear of 
being contradicted that based on the views we have heard from our engage-
ment with the media industry, given the progressive nature of the new Bill of 
Rights in our new Constitution and particularly based on the values and ide-
als of our heroic liberation struggle whose recognition is now enshrined in 
our new Constitution, I honestly believe that the time has come to remove 
criminal defamation from our system of justice in the national interest.  
(Minister Jonathan Moyo, quoted in Sunday Mail 2013b).  
 
 
This is an interesting turn of events, since Minister Moyo was central to the drafting of both 
POSA and AIPPA, and has also previously filed many defamation claims against media 
companies. For instance, in the two years between 2001 and 2003, Minister Moyo himself 
filed more than 20 defamation cases against The Zimbabwe Independent (Professor Geoff 
Feltoe, quoted in Open Society Foundation 2009:32). Currently the Minister of Justice, 
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Emmerson Mnangagwa, is claiming defamation damages 
from the media company Alpha Media Holdings for 1 million US dollars (NewsAfrica 
2013).   
 
The legislation restricting freedom of speech in POSA, AIPPA and the Criminal Code has 
been criticized by both national and international media and human rights organisations in 
the more than ten years they have been in existence. During her visit to Zimbabwe in May 
2012, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, Navi Pillay, commented on the use of 
section 33, and her concern regarding the “corrosive effect of these laws” (OCHCR 2012).  
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3.2 The chilling effect of existing legislation in Zimbabwe 
As mentioned above, many countries have some form of insult or defamation laws, but the 
use of such laws is prevalent in countries facing some kind of political or civil conflict 
(Balule 2009:406). In Zimbabwe there has been a reported increase in the laws used against 
media and other public voices during the last decade or so, since the political and economic 
crisis started at the end of the 1990s (ibid). In this main section of the thesis, I will see if I 
can approach an answer to the initial question: How is the Zimbabwean legislation and 
official practices regarding insult laws and criminal defamation of public officials affecting 
critical voices (media, artists) – in which way can it be said that the legislation has a 
‘chilling effect’ on public expressions? I will look at the effects of this legislation on public 
expressions, including what alternative strategies are being employed as a reaction to the 
state legislation and practices. Does the legislation affect public voices, and under what 
conditions to these effects materialise? I will have a main focus on the media, due to its 
important role in society, but I will also look at artistic expressions. 
 
3.2.1 The media 
I started out with the assumption that media in Zimbabwe is not operating freely. I have 
already presented briefly some of the Zimbabwe legislation that restricts media operations. 
The country is placed as number 135 out of 180 on The World Press Freedom Index 2014 
(Reporters without borders 2014:31). A report from the Committee to Protect Journalists 
(CPJ) documents that 49 journalists have fled Zimbabwe since 2001 for political reasons 
(CPJ:2011), the big majority of them during the first half of the decade. But there are many 
factors contributing to media restrictions. What are the effects of legislation on the media, 
and which strategies do journalists, editors and media houses use in this environment? 
 
The Zimbabwe society is politically divided, and this is also reflected in the media. The 
media is highly polarized, with the state-controlled media on one side and the so-called 
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independent or privately owned media on the other. There are of course individual differ-
ences, but independent media studies show that both sides have a bias in their reporting.
17
  
A study published in June 2013 based on interviews with key media actors concludes that 
“there was unanymity [sic] among both journalists and civil society respondents that the 
journalism profession in Zimbabwe is currently saddled with a serious ethical and credibil-
ity deficit” (Chuman 2013:19). The study also states that “[t]he gap between the journalist 
observer and the political activist/commissariat officer has all but vanished” (Chuma 
2013:6), describing how some representatives from the media are actively taking a partisan 
political role in their reporting. 
 
The effect of the current legislation would of course differ depending on which media 
house or newspaper you work for. Since I have focused on the effect that legislation has on 
oppositional voices, I have not interviewed representatives from the state-controlled media. 
 
3.2.1.1 Self-censorship 
Before starting the interviews, I assumed that self-censorship among journalists takes place, 
since this has been documented in several studies and reports (see for example Open Socie-
ty Foundation 2009 and African Media Barometer 2012). As Skjerdal points out, self-
censorship in Zimbabwe is related to the strong political control that the state has over the 
media (Skjerdal 2010:100), but due to the repressive media regulation it is an issue not only 
present in state media but also categorical in the private media (ibid:102). Even though I 
assumed that self-censorship was an issue, I was still interested in learning more about the 
characteristics of self-censorship and to which degree it still takes place. 
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 See for example Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe’s report Media Credibility Index on the elections 
2013, concluding that “Both the state-owned media and some sections of the private media were biased in 
their coverage of the July 31 elections” (MMPZ 2013:16). 
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Self-censorship can take different forms. One form of it is that a journalist simply does not 
investigate something that could lead to a story; another form is that the journalist has the 
information but fails to publish anything on it. Another form of self-censorship is that he or 
she alters the story by not giving all the information that has been obtained or by twisting 
the focus of the news story so as not to cause offence. Due to the specific legislation pro-
tecting the President, several of the informants said that special attention was given to arti-
cles where the president himself was implied in a story in a negative way, which indicates 
that special caution must be taken when publishing a story where the president is involved. 
Section 33 is not invoked in many cases involving media expressions; however comments 
regarding the President can lead to charges of violation of Section 31 (since criticism of the 
President can be deemed as being prejudicial to the State). 
 
The situation for media practitioners is perceived by all the informants to be difficult, caus-
ing self-censorship. There was a general agreement that the situation had been especially 
grave during the period from 2000 until 2009, when the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) was established.
18
 Even though the situation became easier after 2009, the repres-
sion was still felt, and several journalists told me that they had experienced a cross-pressure 
during the GNU, because representatives from the MDC had also reacted to critical cover-
age. Therefor the current situation, after the elections in 2013, was perceived as being radi-
cally improved. “Now, in the last six months or so you see a relaxation”. (Interview nr 6, 
Editor/journalist 27.03.2014).  
 
However, all the informants were absolutely clear on the fact that self-censorship is still 
being practiced in Zimbabwean media, both by journalists and editors. 
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 There were also accounts of media repression before 2000, and arrests and defamation charges under legis-
lation that existed prior to POSA, AIPPA and Criminal Code, but this is outside of the scope of the investiga-
tion. “Journalism here has been a hard road, you know. There has never been a free press here.” (Interview nr 
8, Media expert/journalist 28.03.2014).  
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I find the effects to still exist up till today, with such a huge blow of fear and 
even paranoia were part of it, I will never forget that period. […] I would re-
ally think more than twice before I started typing a story, where would this 
story take me.     (Interview nr 2, Journalist 25.03.2014) 
 
 
Self-censorship is not performed by the journalist in isolation. The role of the editors is 
important, and also in some instances the owners. One journalist commented in this way on 
the new role that editors and owners took in the exercise of media censorship:  
 
We were like, we had turned into a fraternity under siege. We would go to 
the newsroom, and before you would do anything or try to think about it, ed-
itors, our editors, and even the owners, had turned into arch rivals for jour-
nalists in the newsroom, instead of them aiding and playing their role in the 
newspaper to get good stories, they were now the first gatekeepers playing 
the role of the state […] It had a significant impact in as far as our freedom 
to report on issues. There was a palpable change in the dynamics in report-
ing, for journalists, including foreign journalists.  
(Interview nr 2, Journalist 25.03.2014)   
 
One journalist informed me that he had written an article anonymously and was arrested 
and ‘disappeared’ for a couple of days before he was returned to his home. According to 
him, it was his editor who had given his name and full access to his files, to the police, due 
to the editor’s close relationship with people within the ZANU-PF government and the po-
lice force.
19
  
 
Quite a few editors were arrested during these years, from 2000 – 2009, alongside with 
journalists, and editors are still being arrested in Zimbabwe on charges related to defama-
tion and insult. Therefore it is no wonder that some editors take on the role as ‘gate keep-
ers’, as the informant calls it, self-censoring the content of their news product. However, 
the interviews also show that some editors take on the opposite role and support journalists 
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 Interview nr 6, Editor/journalist 27.03.2014 
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who try to do investigative journalism, and some even push journalists to investigate and 
publish articles. One former journalist, now editor, showed me one of the last editions of 
his newspaper and commented:   
 
You look at this story [… ], the first thing that you want to notice is, it’s 
written “staff reporter”. But the person who wrote that story is [name of re-
porter], who is in there. She didn’t want to use her name, and that becomes a 
statement in itself […]. So, the mere thing that she doesn’t want her name in 
there means that she has already, to some extent she has already censored 
herself. I actually had to take out the whip for her to write the story because 
she was so scared, right, she didn’t want to write the story. But I think it’s 
because you know, of what she has seen happening in the past when you 
write, you know, information on stuff like this.     
       (Interview nr 6, Editor/journalist 27.03.2014)   
 
3.2.1.1.1 Reasons for self-censoring 
I have established that self-censoring is being practiced in Zimbabwe even at the time of 
the field work (March – April 2014), although to a lesser degree than in earlier years. In 
order to assess the effects of the legislation, it is necessary to look at the reasons behind 
self-censoring and analyze to which extent they are related to the legislation. In the anony-
mous story by the frightened journalist, the self-censorship hadn’t stopped at excluding the 
reporter’s name from the published story: 
 
The investigating didn’t go as far as it was supposed to go, One: because of 
the self-restriction that the reporter puts on herself, you know she didn’t go 
out and talk to […] and other things. Right, so this is self-restriction. […] So, 
they are scared that either they could be harmed, or, as in the case of the lead 
story here, the person who actually incited the story is a person who was 
supposed to be a contact, a source of information. Now there’s a fear that, 
you know, if I bring up my name, and maybe I take it further, you know, I 
might prejudice my relations with the source. That has always been a di-
lemma with journalists: to what extent do you write in a negative way about 
a source, […] or the organization for that matter, for which that particular 
source works for. So the self-restriction once again, because you say, you 
ask yourself: am I going to prejudice my relationship with the source.        
(Interview nr 6, Editor/journalist 27.03.2014)   
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The fear of jeopardizing the relationship with sources would be a well-known dilemma for 
journalists doing investigative journalism all over the world, and is not necessarily related 
to the particular situation in Zimbabwe. However, several journalists referred to the fear for 
the physical safety of sources as a factor leading to extra caution. The same journal-
ist/editor who had “taken out the whip” to have his reporter do a story had also allowed for 
the story not to go as far as it could have done due to her worries, thereby acknowledging 
their relevance. He also told me about a story that he never wrote even though he consid-
ered it to be breaking news, due to his concerns for his source’s safety as well as his own. 
  
I got a story, quite interestingly, and it has never seen the light of day. […] 
But when it comes to a crunch, you can either be obliged to reveal your 
source in court, or these guys may use other means, extra-juridical means, to 
make you talk and tell on who actually gave you the information. And then I 
said to myself, you know, what are the implications on the source, you 
know, imagine he might have said it to me as a friend and stuff like that, you 
know, but it would harm his job and everything, and, you know, he could get 
killed at the end of the day, so, finally I put it aside. So, because of those two 
fears; I was considering his fate, but I was also considering my fate. 
 (Interview nr 6, Editor/journalist 27.03.2014)   
   
Here the journalist shows the intended chilling effect of the legislation (if the article was 
found to be in violation of the law he could be obliged to reveal the source in court), but he 
also refers to the fear of extra-judicial sanctions. This incident had happened about two 
years earlier, i.e. under the previous Constitution that did not explicitly provide for the con-
fidentiality of sources.  
 
Stories from other journalists show that the fear of being forced to reveal the source is a 
well-grounded fear. It appears that arrests on charges of defamation or publishing false-
hoods are often accompanied by different kinds of pressure to make journalists reveal their 
sources.  
 
Our charge was publishing falsehoods. But that wasn’t the minister’s inten-
tion. I will show you what they really were trying to do under the guise of 
the law. Through a whole year, this thing lasted a whole year until we were 
 30 
acquitted, but what he really wanted to do, they made it clear at the police 
station, he wanted to force us into revealing our sources.  
(Interview nr 2, Journalist 25.03.2014)   
 
This is corroborated by stories told by other journalists (MISA 2013). Journalists can also 
find themselves in a squeeze, where they are given the options either to reveal their sources 
to substantiate the allegations that they have made, or to be charged under section 31 in the 
Criminal Code (or previously under the similar provisions in the POSA or AIPPA legisla-
tion) for publishing a false statement prejudicial to the state. Given such alternatives the 
journalist finds him –or herself in a real dilemma between journalistic ethics and personal 
wellbeing and security.   
 
The journalist who had refrained from writing a story due to his and his source’s safety also 
referred to the ‘extra-judicial’ practice used by the police to force journalists to reveal their 
sources. This was confirmed by several of the journalists, who had either experienced po-
lice brutality and threats themselves or who narrated specific incidents where this had hap-
pened to colleagues (see also MISA 2013 for stories from journalists who experienced vio-
lence and torture by police or other state agents). Even though the law now provides for the 
confidentiality of a journalist’s sources, there is no confidence that the law in itself gives 
enough safety for journalists.  
 
But even in the past, the Supreme court has ruled that journalists are not 
obliged to reveal their sources, which is of course another reason why [the 
police] subject them to interrogation, and, well, physical interrogation if 
that’s what you call it, so it doesn’t go on the record anyway, it’s just, you 
know, they’ll use that all the time as well.  
                                       (Interview nr 8, Media expert/journalist 28.03.2014)   
 
This fear of third persons’ security was also mentioned by a publisher as a reason not to 
publish a book, even though people had been eager to participate in the book project. 
  
And everybody was passionate to tell their story, under their name, but I was 
fearful that perhaps they didn’t realize the implications, especially if they 
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were very vulnerable people, they could be just set upon at night by war vets 
and that would be the end of them”  (Interview, nr 11, publisher 01.04.2014).  
 
The experience and level of professional training of the journalists can also have an impact 
on their self-censoring. Talking about the major challenges of investigative journalism in 
Zimbabwe today, one of the editors (and experienced journalist) commented: 
 
But then also there is an issue of the capacity of the investigative reporters 
themselves, in which case I think a lot of training has to be done, and it also 
comes with experience. If I was to talk about myself, I’m working with fairly 
junior guys, right, and because of their inexperience, sometimes they are just 
too scared. Sometimes they self-censor themselves, and they don’t want to 
go out there and do their story, sometimes they lack the capacity to go out 
and do the stories.                  (Interview nr 6, Editor/journalist, 27.03.2014)   
 
I have no empirical evidence to sustain the argument that younger and less experienced 
journalists self-censor more than older journalists do, but the same thing is said by several 
of the informants, and it is also said about younger scholars by more experienced academ-
ics. It is also one of the findings of the African Media Barometer Zimbabwe 2012, that 
“Amongst the younger journalists there is a culture of fear and they are unable to deal with 
intimidation” (p 53). This indicates that age is one of the individual factors that have im-
pact on the perceived chilling effect of the legislation. Young age can increase the per-
ceived vulnerability due to lack of experience and because young people could have less 
networks and be more vulnerable. Given that the media restrictions increased from around 
year 2000 and onwards, it is plausible that younger journalists who have not experienced 
the less restricted working environment would self-censor more than those old enough to 
have been trained and having worked under less restrictive conditions. 
 
I think it will be fair to say that the environment post-2000, and particularly 
post-2002 with that AIPPA and POSA were enacted, freedom of speech, and 
other freedoms and liberties, have been constrained, and I wouldn’t know 
what the situation was like before 2002 in respect of the media, but it’s very 
clear that post the enactment of POSA and AIPPA there was a lot of self-
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censorship that did not diminish with the GNU
20
, and I think it became em-
bedded, it became institutionalized, and also when the products that were 
produced, the media products, in the sense of journalists trained after those 
repressive pieces of legislation, they were trained by those who were also 
fearful of what to say.                          (Interview nr 10, Scholar, 31.03.2014)   
 
Journalism training has been affected by the post-2000 repressive environment (Banda 
et.al. 2007:167), as has the working environment for journalists, leaving new journalists 
without many good practices to lead them in their pursuit of a career in media. This comes 
in addition to other challenges facing the media, such as the lack of sufficient funding, time 
pressure and not good enough journalism training (African Media Barometer Zimbabwe 
2012:53). All these will affect investigative journalism especially hard.  
 
3.2.1.2 Other strategies employed by the media 
Self-censorship is one of the strategies employed by the media in the face of strict govern-
ment control. Another strategy is anonymity, which is very common in Zimbabwean news-
papers. Quite a few of the articles you read in both printed and online publications will not 
have a name in the byline, just “staff reporter”. This is a common way of not drawing atten-
tion to yourself as a journalist, but it is not a completely safe mode. Above we saw one 
example of a journalist being arrested after having written an anonymous article because 
his editor gave him away. The fact that editors will always be responsible for the content of 
the media production makes it impossible for them to stay anonymous, and both media 
owners and editors have faced criminal charges due to the content that has been published 
in their product. 
 
Another strategy that is being employed by Zimbabwean journalists and media owners is to 
move the publications out of the country, either by printing abroad or by publishing stories 
online. The introduction of the new restrictive legislation after 2000, and the closing down 
                                                 
 
20
 GNU = Government of national unity, the joint government of ZANU-PF and the two MDC-parties.  
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of several newspapers in 2003, triggered “an unprecedented mushrooming of news web-
sites on Zimbabwe across the internet” (Moyo 2007:84). Although online newspapers had 
been in existence since the 1990s, these events led to the establishing of a huge number of 
new websites, some of which still exist today. Also, quite a few of these new websites dif-
fered from the old ones in that they were not linked to existing print publications, but were 
stand-alone news websites (ibid). The form and quality of the online publications vary a 
lot. Some of them are online newspapers who produce their own material following ordi-
nary journalistic professional guidelines, others don’t practice independent journalism but 
only links up to other online articles, and some produce their own material without follow-
ing journalistic principles and ethics. One of the informants, who had been involved in the 
establishment of one such online publication, tells the following on how such publications 
came about: 
 
We ended up, as media practitioners, as part of the media, finding ways out, 
and it led to a rise in the establishment of, if I may use, if I may abuse, that 
word: off-shore media outlets. Around that period, I will give you a personal 
experience, now I can testify about it, it’s no longer a secret, around that pe-
riod Zimbabwe witnessed a huge influx of, a huge surge of the establishment 
of shadowy online publications, by us. Operating there in the newsroom, 
writing stories daily, but going away to establish anonymous, they were 
faceless, online publications. [...].  
 
Journalists […], as we found ourselves in this trap, and apparently like you 
say, working out daily and getting some powerful and juicy stories, we cir-
cumvented the whole situation by establishing these faceless, by faceless I 
mean nobody knew who was behind, it was our secret, it was just something 
on the internet, running sensational, very hard-beating, you know. When 
someone is under restriction and they get some freedom elsewhere they will 
go berserk, they will exploit. Including now blatant falsehoods, clearly 
meant to hit at the regime.  
      (Interview nr. 2, Journalist, 25.03.2014) 
 
The establishment of such online publications confirms the assumption that the legislation 
in itself has a chilling effect, since stories are published online that could not have seen the 
light of day in traditional Zimbabwean publications. On the other hand, the story also 
shows that such online publications have a risk of falling into the trap of unprofessionalism 
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and gossip. “Far removed from the arm of the Zimbabwean law, some have published un-
substantiated stories bordering on defamation” (Moyo 2007:91). The possibility of absolute 
anonymity that is offered by online publications due to the perceived threat to journalists’ 
personal security also fuels such unprofessionalism (ibid). This mirrors Barendt’s sugges-
tion that one of the structural chilling effects of libel laws in the UK is that the media be-
comes more polemical as opposed to factually-oriented (1997:193). Thus, when the gov-
ernment regulates the media so strictly, one unintended effect is that the government ex-
poses itself to more false anonymous stories.  
 
That aside, there is no doubt that online publications are offering information to Zimba-
bweans, both inside the country and in the diaspora, that would not have been available 
without these, thus reducing the gate-keeping role of the state controlled media in Zimba-
bwe (Moyo 2007:101). As was pointed out to be me by several of the informants, there is 
also an interrelationship between the traditional media inside Zimbabwe and such online 
publications, where the one will follow up on stories published in the other. However, 
online publications still have a limited reach in Zimbabwe today. Although internet is be-
coming more available with the spread of mobile phones, especially smart phones, the cost 
of internet is in itself a limitation even for those who have possible access.  
 
The restrictive legislation also caused some media owners to move the printing of their 
news product out of the country, to avoid having to apply for registration by Zimbabwean 
authorities (the most criticized content of the AIPPA is its registration requirements, that 
extends from media houses to individual journalists, refusing people to practice as journal-
ists unless they have been lawfully registered and have received their certificate). Some 
publications are still printed abroad (in South Africa), but my impression is that this is now 
more due to financial reasons than political, since it has become easier to obtain legal regis-
tration in Zimbabwe for print media. When it comes to radio, there are strict restrictions on 
radio licenses which continue up until today (as of May 2014), despite the campaigning of 
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several community radios and other media organisations in Zimbabwe. However, the inter-
net has also here provided new options, and several radios broadcast online.
21
   
 
3.2.2 Other public voices - artistic expressions in music, theatre and literature  
In this section I will look at how the legislation affects artists in present-day Zimbabwe, 
and what their strategies are to cope with the situation. I will start by introducing the case 
of Owen Maseko, which is mentioned above, as an example of how the government is us-
ing legislation to restrict artistic expressions.  
 
On the 25
th
 of March 2010, the Zimbabwean visual artist Owen Maseko opened his exhibi-
tion entitled Sibathontisele
22
 in the National Art Gallery in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. The next 
day the exhibition was shut down and banned, and Mr. Maseko was arrested and charged 
with contravening section 33 of the Criminal Code: Undermining authority of or insulting 
President. The charges were dropped after the Constitutional Court had ruled the section 
unconstitutional. The Maseko-case has gotten much attention both internationally and with-
in Zimbabwe.  
3.2.2.1 Artistic censorship and self-censorship 
Artists are affected by different legislation and in a different way than the media. Section 
31 is not an issue for most artists, whereas the insult law in section 33 is more relevant. 
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 The most popular ones are Voice of America Zimbabwe (available on www.voazimbabwe.com) and SW 
Radio Africa (available on www.swradioafrica.com). 
22
 This is an Ndebele word, meaning ‘we drip on them’ or ‘let’s drip on them’, which is referring to a torture 
technique of dripping hot, melted plastic on victims. This torture was used by the Fifth brigade in the opera-
tion in the Matabeleland-region in the 1980s known as the Gukurahundi; a Shona word, meaning ‘the rain 
that washes away the chaff’ (Maseko 2011:93). Between 10 000 and 20 000 people are estimated to have 
been killed in this violence that lasted from 1983 to 1987.  The aim of the operation was to crush political 
dissidents from ZAPU, but the massacre also had an ethnic aspect, since most members of the Fifth brigade 
were Shona and their victims were Ndebele (Sachikonye 2011:16) 
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According to the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act, all public performances are 
prohibited unless approved by the Board of Censors (article 16:1), but according to my 
information it is very rare that artists apply for approval for shows or performances, unless 
they are forming part of a larger event such as the annual HIFA (Harare International Festi-
val of the Arts).  
 
They’re supposed to approve, that’s what they say. […] Before you even put 
it on. But I mean, most artists have been kind of ignoring that process, be-
cause we thought it is fraud and really irrelevant to our processes, so a lot of 
theatre shows have been going around the country without being even going 
to the censorship board.   (Interview nr 9, Theatre director/actor, 31.03.2014)  
 
Musicians also seem to be either unaware of, or to largely ignore the requirement of regis-
tering and pre-approval that the Censorship act sets down (see Nyathi 2005). However, 
self-censorship is reported to be very wide-spread among Zimbabwean musicians (Eyre 
2005). This is also what the informants told me, both regarding musicians and thea-
tre/drama artists.  
 
The real challenge that I see in terms of freedom of speech in this country is, 
first and foremost, people end up practicing serious self-censorship because 
of what has happened in the past. I know for a fact that I’ve, I think for sing-
ing my music my shows have been, I have not been allowed to do shows, as 
and when I want to do them. […] I think on a couple of occasions, I went to 
perform and I was told I couldn’t perform, because I don’t sing what is ac-
ceptable.  
 
And there are so many other musicians, who when they hear or read this, 
they start practicing self-censorship on their own. Because, at the end of the 
day, you know, these musicians are professional people, they survive 
through the trade. Now, if you’re going to sing things that are going to be 
called unacceptable, you kill your profession, and you kill your life, and you 
kill your children, you kill your survival kit. So, at the end of the day, I’m 
convinced this is why, in this country, a lot of people are not going to be 
found singing confrontational music.   
(Interview nr. 4, Musician, 26.03.2014)     
 
Although official censorship of music occurs very rarely (Eyre 2004:94), the most common 
way that the authorities apply censorship seems to be unofficial, by people not being able 
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to book a place for their events or by songs being ‘banned’ from being played on the na-
tional broadcaster ZBC (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation).  
 
There is a censorship board, but the real problem is, the music is not neces-
sarily censored by that board, it is censored by some people sitting some-
where, and all they do is they sit there and they say: This is not acceptable, 
and therefore it will never get air played.    
(Interview nr. 4, Musician, 26.03.2014)     
 
Due to his albums not being played on the radio, this musician gave out several albums 
under a pseudonym, and then these songs were played: 
 
Ultimately I then had to devise a plan of changing my name, and changing 
the name, and the music started playing on the radio. Which means it’s pure-
ly about the name. Not the music. […] Yes, it’s actually played now, on ra-
dio, and I hear it actually played every day, every other day that I switch on 
to the Zimbabwe radio stations, I come across my music, and they celebrate 
that: It’s that guy, and I say to myself: So really…   
(Interview nr. 4, Musician, 26.03.2014)     
 
The informality of this kind of censorship makes it hard to challenge in the courts, because 
it can be hard to prove that a song has in fact been banned. It is not easy to ‘prove’ that a 
song has sufficient musical qualities to earn its right to be played on national radio. It is 
also hard to establish where the orders to ban music come from, and there is seldom official 
confirmation that an album has been banned.  
 
The example of Thomas Mapfumo can illustrate the unofficial censorship. Thomas Map-
fumo is one of the most famous singers in Zimbabwe, and also known for his protest mu-
sic. After having been one of the most important musicians supporting the new government 
throughout the 1980s, Mr. Mapfumo started to sing more critical songs from 1989 and on-
wards. His falling out with the Zimbabwean government led to him leaving Zimbabwe, and 
he still lives abroad. He moved to the US in 2000, and gave his last performance in Zimba-
bwe in 2004 (Eyre 2012). Apparently he faces criminal charges in Zimbabwe; he was ac-
cused of buying stolen cars. The informants perceived these to be phony charges, made up 
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by the authorities to frame Mr. Mapfumo, but I don't know the status of these charges to-
day. He is still a very popular musician in Zimbabwe. In fact, the state-controlled newspa-
per The Herald carried a story about him having arrived in Harare the previous night as 
their April fool’s day prank in their print edition on April 1st 2014, leading to “scores of 
people [calling] the newsroom enquiring” (The Herald 2014).23 In an interview in 2002 Mr. 
Mapfumo talked about the banning of his album Chimurenga Rebel:  
 
Well, I was a bit concerned, but I wasn’t afraid. I knew a lot of ears were lis-
tening. A lot of people liked it, though as you know, Chimurenga Rebel was 
banned from being played on the radio. And this, I can confirm with you, 
because I spoke with one of the DJ’s who is working with ZBC, and he said 
they were called to a meeting by this Minister of Information, Jonathan 
Moyo. They discussed about my music, especially this recently released one, 
Chimurenga Rebel. He was saying a lot of things about the music. “This is 
why this guy named his music Chimurenga Rebel, because he’s a rebel. He’s 
just like a terrorist.” They were trying to deny, to say that the music was not 
banned, but it was banned.                                             (Freemuse 2002)   
 
The same experience of music being banned, but where the ban was unofficial and denied 
by the authorities, was narrated in 2013 by Leonard Zhakata, another popular Zimbabwean 
musician: 
 
No one would confirm the ban, but at the same time you didn’t hear the mu-
sic,” he recalls. […] The first time the singer found out his music could not 
be heard on the radio was in 2003, when he released his album ‘Hodho’. He 
tried to engage with the authorities, but to no avail. Of all of the songs on the 
album, only one was played on the radio: a love song.          (Roosblad 2013) 
 
Even the previous Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangerai, has told publically about how his 
autobiography (Tsvangerai and Bango 2011) has been unofficially banned and that the pol-
                                                 
 
23
 In fact, Thomas Mapfumo sent a public message to Zimbabweans for the 2014 Independence day (April 
18), where he announced that he will be returning to Zimbabwe in September 2014 to perform for his fans 
(Mapfumo 2014). It will be interesting to see how he will be received by politicians, and how this event will 
be covered in the different media. 
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ive have raided bookshops that were selling his book (Sibanda 2012). In December 2011 a 
female book shop owner was arrested and charged with a violation of Section 33 of the 
Criminal Code (Undermining authority of or undermining the President) because she sold 
copies of Tsvangerai’s book (ZLHR 2013). 
 
Recording studios have also received threats, leading to some musicians going to South 
Africa to record, and sellers of music have been targeted the same way as book sellers 
have: 
 
If you travel around Harare, you won’t find anywhere where they are selling 
my music, because nobody accepts. If you go with your music and you say: 
Can you please sell it? The next thing they will tell you is: The police will 
come and confiscate everything, so… Somebody then has to make a decision 
to say, can I then lose all these other CDs because of these ten? So it then 
becomes a problem.                           (Interview nr. 4, Musician, 26.03.2014)     
 
 
As narrated above, musicians can also experience that they receive a visit before a perfor-
mance, by the police or other state officials, telling them which songs they should not per-
form that night, or being told that they are not allowed to do a show. Since the Censorship 
Act prohibits all public performances that doesn’t have a pre-approved censorship certifi-
cate, the law can be used at any point in time to stop a performance. This means that the 
legislation is an effective threat the police can use against an artist to instruct the artist on 
which songs he or she can or cannot perform in the show. Due to the economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe, and increasing piracy of records, public performances are the main income 
generation for most artists. This means that they are very vulnerable to the threat of closing 
down or stopping their shows.  
 
This vulnerability leads to artists self-censoring, either by avoiding certain political sub-
jects altogether, or by being careful how they express themselves. I already mentioned that 
anonymity, as in recording or publishing under pseudonyms, is a strategy that some artists 
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use. Also art itself offers wide opportunities to express things in a more subtle way than 
news reporting and media work does.  
 
And then the beauty of the theatre is, you can say things on, you can talk 
about anything, I mean, in such a way that doesn’t really provoke people. 
Because, I mean, my intention with my plays and stuff that I do is not really 
to provoke directly, I want people to think and then act on, because also 
[…in ]an oppressive system that we’re operating under, you wouldn’t want 
to do that because you’ll just end up in jail and then you rot in jail, you 
won’t be performing in jail, so it’s better then to find  strategies to go out to 
the people, disseminating information while you’re staying alive and out of 
prison, so I mean that’s one goal that we’ve tried to do is to make our play 
relevant and accepted within our communities so that they are not even 
afraid to watch the show. 
                                       (Interview nr. 9, Theatre director/actor, 31.03.2014)    
 
A theatre performance possesses a wider range of possible forms of communication than a 
song, and can communicate multiple messages. However, this strategy is also used by mu-
sicians as an alternative way of self-censoring:  
 
Yea, they tend to sing in parables, like if they sing in Shona, they use prov-
erbs that can be interpreted in many ways. But those who are in the opposi-
tion will say: oh, he’s the one that said this, therefor he is with us. ZANU-PF 
will say: actually this meant that…. So, there are lots of parables that are 
used. They speak in tongues, it’s up to you to interpret. So again, that’s self-
censorship. It’s not because of the richness of the Shona language or the 
Ndbele language, but they are trying to avoid making explicit statements for 
or against. Many musicians have, their careers have collapsed.   
                                      (Interview nr. 10, Scholar, 31.03.2014)   
 
It is important to note that artists find themselves in a squeeze between the different politi-
cal sides in this polarized society, and self-censoring is not only being used to suppress 
political opinions that could be deemed critical of the ZANU-PF. Artists would also want 
to avoid being labelled as too sympathetic to the governing party, because this could lead to 
them loosing income from fans on ‘the other side’.  
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Self-censoring will also have a geographical aspect to it. Several of the informants said that 
there was a big difference in what could be publically expressed in urban centers such as 
Harare and Bulawayo, which are known to be MDC-T strongholds, and what could be ex-
pressed in more rural districts.  
 
There are certain places where we won’t… Like, we had one show, you 
know, touring the nation and then we were to say: in this particular area 
we’re not even going to mention so-and-so-and-so, we have to really censor 
ourself and really trim the information […] but try to stay true to the story 
that we had, but there are certain areas where we just have to cut things out, 
because it’s not like they are educated well enough to understand, their lead-
ers just come and say: [person’s name] is a criminal, so whenever [he] shows 
up, [he] is a criminal. So even if I try to explain: I am not a criminal, I am 
just trying to freely express myself and this and that, but no no no, you’re a 
criminal, you get us into trouble for listening to your play.  
(Interview nr. 9, Theatre director/actor, 31.03.2014)    
 
However, the strongest self-censorship appears to be regarding the mentioning of the Presi-
dent. Even when artists don’t see the need to censor the content of their work, there is 
widespread self-censorship regarding mentions of the President:  
 
These are social and political issues. There’s no way that I can try to, you 
know, to polish them or to you know, to cover them in chocolate and stuff 
like that. They are there, if you don’t have water, from where I come from, I 
have to tell people, I don’t have water, we don’t have electricity. But I mean, 
when you want to mention names now, that’s when I just have to, you know, 
kind of censor myself. Sometimes you’re also censoring yourself, you know, 
long before they even censor you, because you know that they will censor 
you definitely, and then it won’t be so nice, the picture won’t be so nice.          
     (Interview nr. 9, Theatre director/actor, 31.03.2014 
 
This is something that is present in everyday life in Zimbabwe, where people are careful to 
not make any comments on the President. Almost any critical comment about the President 
in the presence of at least one more person could lead to a criminal charge of violating sec-
tion 33 of the Criminal code. The use of this section has increased since 2010, and between 
2010 and June 2013 the human rights organization Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 
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had attended to 63 cases of individuals that had been charged with violating section 33 
(ZLHR 2013), including the Owen Maseko-case mentioned above.  
 
It appears that writers have been under less official scrutiny than musicians, which can be 
explained by the limited reach that literature has compared to music. However, there seem 
to have been an increased awareness by the authorities that all cultural spaces can be used 
for political expressions:  
 
I think, you know, that in the last 5-6 years, literature, I mean fiction, that 
had always been a very neutral terrain, had suddenly become a very political, 
was politicized, became a very political terrain, and maybe the CIO had 
woken up to the fact, maybe because of HIFA
24
, CIO had woken up to the 
fact that culture was an intensely political arena, and not the soft arena they 
had though it was, or not really thought about at all.  
                                                          (Interview nr. 11, Publisher, 01.04.2014)     
 
3.2.2.2 Other strategies employed by artists 
In addition to self-censoring in different ways, as shown above, there are also other strate-
gies that artists use to avoid negative reactions. I mentioned that one of the musicians had 
given out music under a pseudonym to avoid his songs from being banned by the radio. 
Anonymity or pseudonyms can be used as a way of avoiding legal repercussions. However, 
since income comes from public performances this would not be a viable strategy for most 
musicians who need their work to be income generating as well. Based on my information, 
the use of pseudonyms in published literature does not seem to be common. The publisher I 
talked to said that she had never had an author approach the publishing house asking to use 
a pseudonym: 
 
Never. There is no censorship. I can say that honestly. But it’s also partly, if 
I’m printing a book, I may be printing 300 nowadays, the quantity is very 
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 HIFA = Harare International Festival of the Arts. An annual arts festival in Harare that has caused contro-
versy during the last couple of years. 
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small. And most people don’t read. You’re printing a newspaper, you might 
be printing 10 000. If we were printing in Shona, and printing 25 000, it 
would be different.                           (Interview nr. 11, Publisher, 01.04.2014)         
  
The same was said about publishing theatre manuscripts; that there would be no problem in 
publishing almost any manuscript under a full name, but the main challenge was financial 
and the lack of a market. However, in the 2014 HIFA (Harare International Festival of the 
Arts), one of the controversial plays that was performed did not credit the writer in the fes-
tival program. The state-controlled newspaper The Herald commented on the anonymity in 
this way: “For some obscure reason, HIFA organisers chose not to put the name of the 
writer of the play but The Herald understands the play was based on a book an on [sic] ar-
my general who was a homosexual.”(Mbiriyamveka 2014).25 I do not know the festival’s 
reason for omitting the writer’s name, but homosexuality is a very controversial and sensi-
tive issue in Zimbabwe, which could indicate that this was an intended act.  
 
In addition to using artistic expressions and subtleness to avoid criminal charges or being 
labelled politically, theatre practitioners can also use different strategies to avoid the cen-
sorship laws and other regulations: 
 
When we go to the communities we use what we call guerrilla theatre, you 
know, where you just go into the community and you round up people, and 
then within an hour, or within 30 minutes, you perform the show, and then 
you disappear. So sometimes there’s no need for clearance. So we’ve never 
had a show been stopped.  
                                        (Interview nr. 9, Theatre director/actor, 31.03.2014)    
 
                                                 
 
25
 The biggest controversy of HIFA 2014 was when the South African band Freshlyground were denied en-
trance to Zimbabwe when they were coming to perform at the closing show. The band made a critical song 
and music video about President Robert Mugabe in 2010, and the entry denial was linked to this by several 
media and the band itself, even though Zimbabwe authorities claimed it was due to the lack of valid work 
permits (NewsDay 2014c). 
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The same strategy of giving unannounced shows was also mentioned as a strategy used by 
some musicians, who would do unannounced jam sessions at cafés or bars and play songs 
that were not possible to play in pre-announced shows. This however requires that you 
don't have financial needs to be met by performing your art, either because it has been 
funded from elsewhere or because you have income from other sources.  
 
3.2.3 The current situation  
All my media informants stated that the environment was perceived as being freer now 
than it had previously. However, their references were to the post-election state and the 
government formation and not the constitution or the legislation. 
 
But I would say, from last year, when we had general elections, which led to 
the formation of a new government, the situation is quite interesting. The 
legislation still remains as it is, but it is now in the enforcement and the atti-
tudes of those in power, I’ll tell you with confidence, as of right now, I think 
as journalist I’m feeling at my most free, even though not completely free 
because – I think later we’ll talk about the technical restrictions that will al-
ways come some on these things, and the cultural restrictions that come with 
that.       (Interview nr 6, Editor/journalist 27.03.2014) 
 
Multiple references were also given to the role that Information Minister Moyo has taken 
since he was re-appointed Minister in September 2013, where he has given vocal support to 
the freedom of the media and the abolition of criminal defamation. The Minister himself 
frequently refers to the new constitution when he argues for increased media freedoms (see 
for instance NewsAfrica 2013 and SundayMail 2014). Minister Moyo is known as the ar-
chitect behind both the POSA and the AIPPA before he was removed from the minister-
post in 2006. The legislation gives the Minister a wide range of authorities, and the inform-
ants often placed the Minister in central positions when narrating previous incidents, such 
as being personally responsible for detention of journalists or the banning of songs.  
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Although the media perceives the situation as being freer, there is much uncertainty in 
Zimbabwean society as to what will happen now. One uncertainty is related to the constitu-
tion and the realignment of other laws.  
 
It’s comparatively less restrictive, less dangerous, but in as far as nothing has 
changed, legislatively speaking, what could have changed? A long time, the 
media [...], even civil society, in Zimbabwe have gone through that transition 
also, whereby the more you get used to something the more you device 
mechanisms to resist, to avert, to circumvent, and to find your ways around, 
if I may put it that way.          (Interview nr 2, Journalist, 25.03.2014) 
 
Uncertainty is also related to the larger political context. It is harder to assess the situation, 
for example by artists: 
 
[S]o in terms of operating, I won’t say it’s safer or it’s safe to put up a show 
because we’re post election date, I mean, this is kind of the most dangerous 
time, because in election time we’d know what to say, before election you’d 
know what to say, but now, nobody’s saying anything, and you’re not so 
sure who’s watching you and you’re not so sure who’s going to say what. 
[…] so for me it’s a little bit of a challenge to really put up a show without 
knowing who is going to respond to me and how they are going to respond 
to me.  
 
If you know that your father can beat you for stealing sugar, you know, 
when he’s around you would not steal sugar. You’ll be a nice and obedient 
son. And if he’s not around, you know also how to behave. So for me this is 
kind of tricky phase, for anyone, even the civil society groups, they don’t 
know what kind of position they’re in, they don’t say anything, because of 
where we’re coming from, from the election period, we don’t know what the 
other opposition party is planning to do, we don’t even know the same struc-
tures that have been put in place with the current government, so for me it’s 
a little bit of a tricky phase. […] Especially dealing with those kind of the-
matic issues that we talked about, I mean, good governance, democracy, you 
know, you don’t want to be found on the wrong side.                                
    (Interview nr. 9, Theatre director/actor, 31.03.2014)    
 
3.3 The effect of legislation on public voices in Zimbabwe 
I have now presented my findings on how representatives from the media and the art world 
in Zimbabwe perceive their situation, and their different strategies to cope with the restric-
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tive legal environment. I believe that I have shown clearly that there is in fact a ‘chilling’ of 
public expressions in Zimbabwe, both in the media and the art world, where people do not 
feel completely free to express themselves. I will now use the theories presented in chapter 
2 to discuss to which degree we can say that the legislation itself is behind this chilling. To 
do so I must look at the factors mentioned there; Knowledge of the legislation; Perceived 
costs and benefits from a violation, including the probability of detection, the severity of 
possible sanctions and the time laps between the violation and the sanction; and The will-
ingness to violate the law, based on the legitimacy of the legislation and social support for 
violation. 
3.3.1 Defining the ‘margin of terror’ 
The first criteria that needs to be met if we are to conclude that legislation in fact has the 
intended chilling effect is that the legislation needs to be known to the potential offenders. 
Based on my data I would say that Zimbabwean journalists and editors are very familiar 
with the existing legislation that affects them, especially the AIPPA and sections of the 
Criminal Code (the provisions in sections 31 and 33 were mentioned frequently, but also 
criminal defamation). They were also familiar with several concrete cases of arrests on 
charges of violation of these provisions, and this in itself has a chilling effect. Members of 
the media community often have a high degree of professional allegiance, which also 
means that the media writes about incidents involving other journalists or editors. This 
way, and through the work of human rights and media organisations, all arrests and charges 
are quickly publically known (at least in the urban areas or for those with access to inter-
net). The media, especially the independent media, also write quickly about other arrests 
and charges related to violations connected to freedom of expression. On one hand this is 
important to put pressure on the government to release the person(s) arrested or charge him 
or her properly, but on the other hand such publicity can also contribute to chilling other 
people’s expressions.  
 
Precise knowledge of the legislation can also be used to avoid the unintended chilling ef-
fect of legislation, i.e. that legislation chills expressions that are in fact not prohibited by 
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the actual legislation. The importance of knowing the legislation was pointed out by one of 
my informants: 
 
There are certain practitioners who are not aware of certain laws and certain, 
you know, policies that are in place, so they will tend to just withdraw, be-
cause they don’t want to cause trouble, but when you know these particular 
laws, like I know this will never affect me, this will never affect me, you go 
ahead with it, and you put up a show […].  I think as a citizen it’s good also 
to be aware that there are certain structures in place, so either you know how 
to avoid them, or to really confront them, knowing where you are standing. 
But if you don’t know where you are standing, they can just say: Hey, get 
out of here, and you’ll be like: Okay, I’m running away.                                                
                                        (Interview nr. 9, Theatre director/actor, 31.03.2014)    
  
The knowledge of legislation can protect you against lawful attacks, but the same inform-
ant also mentioned how his theatre group would self-censor in certain areas to avoid that 
they would call him ‘a criminal’ and accuse him of getting them in trouble, because not all 
people would know when a performance was legal. This is but one example of the fear of 
unlawful attacks that were mentioned by several informants, especially when talking about 
the situation in certain rural areas. Some of this violence bears resemblances with vigilante 
violence, which is often related to legislation, or at least people’s perception of what the 
legislation says, because it aims to control crime or other social infractions (Johnston 
1996:220). Politically related violence has been widespread in Zimbabwe during the last 
decade, and longer (Sachikonye 2011), and the fear of extrajudicial sanctions such as vio-
lence, either by organized or more ad hoc groups, creates an extra chilling effect on expres-
sions. Even in the urban areas of Harare the informants told me how they would be afraid 
of, or had experienced, war veterans or unidentified people coming to their gate wanting to 
get in.  
 
Having established that there is knowledge about the legislation among media practitioners 
and, although to a lesser degree, artists, we now turn to look at the perceived costs related 
to violations of the law. The first thing to look at is the probability of detection, which is a 
major deterring factor. The probability of detection is of course also about knowledge and 
perception – the deterring effect in each individual case will depend on that person’s 
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knowledge about how many other people have been detected for similar offenses. In a dis-
cussion on self-censorship in replying to surveys and polls, a scholar told me that they 
found a larger ‘margin of terror’ in responses from urban areas than from rural, defining 
‘margin of terror’ as fear-induced answers that had to be taken into account when analyzing 
the survey results.
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 His speculation regarding this was:   
 
Perhaps they know, there’s more interaction and more knowledge about the 
police and what they can do, than in the rural areas. […] On your way here 
you’ll meet the police, you know, on your way back you will meet the po-
lice. In the rural areas, in some remote areas, even a month before they come 
across a police man or a police woman. So they don’t have that kind of live 
experience […] about people who have been arrested or charged or who 
have been tortured because of certain, you know… Torture one, or kill one 
[…], kill one and you scare a thousand. As long as you do it publically, you 
see, so arrest one, and the one thousand they fall in line. But in the rural area, 
if they don’t see anyone being shot or being arrested, they have, you know… 
And of course the hold of the ZANU-PF in the rural areas, they tend to say 
the rights things, so they have nothing to fear, you see?   
                                                             (Interview nr. 10, Scholar, 31.03.2014)   
    
If his theory is correct, we see that knowledge about the possible consequences has a deter-
ring effect on people’s willingness to reply to questions in surveys and polls. I argue that 
the same deterring effect applies to legislation regarding freedom of expression, if the pos-
sible ‘offenders’ perceive the probability of being detected as high enough. Perception of 
own vulnerability and knowledge about how other people have faced consequences for 
similar violations contribute to the chilling effect of the legislation, and enlarges the ‘mar-
gin of terror’ of the legislation. 
 
Above I have shown how different strategies are being applied to avoid detection; Journal-
ists write anonymously as ‘staff reporter’ or write in faceless online publications; sources 
used in media articles are anonymous and therefor impossible to hold accountable, musi-
                                                 
 
26
 It appears that the term ‘margin of terror’ was first used in this way in the Zimbabwe context by the late 
Zimbabwean scholar Masipula Sithole (Bratton, Chikwana and Sithole 2005:106). 
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cians record music under pseudonyms and theatre groups perform ‘guerrilla theatre’. The 
use of such avoidance strategies indicates that the legislation in fact has a chilling effect.  
 
The severity of the sanctions is another element. The legislated sanctions if convicted of 
violating the different legislation I have discussed varies from up to one year imprisonment 
for violating Section 33 to up to 20 years imprisonment for violating Section 31. Criminal 
defamation (section 96) carries a possible sentence of up to 2 years imprisonment. Howev-
er, the length of the sentence is not the only consequence. The judicial system in Zimbabwe 
has a tendency of working slowly in these cases, and several of the informants said that 
their arrests were caused by motives other than a genuine belief that they had violated a law 
and could be convicted in court. 
 
In short, our arrest and the whole year on remand, going to court every 
month, standing in the dock for maybe three minutes and told: Come back 
on this date; was tactically meant to keep us under siege and to be available 
to these guys [the CIO, who wanted them to reveal the sources and how they 
operated as a newspaper], because of this case we would be available to 
these guys.                                        (Interview nr. 2, Journalist, 25.03.2014). 
 
 
I would argue that the Zimbabwean authorities consciously use detention as a way of 
chilling expressions both by the media and by individuals, even when they know that there 
might not be reasonable grounds to believe that the case could end in a conviction. As a 
human rights lawyer I talked to put it “Here the police arrest people to investigate, instead 
of investigate first and then arrest” (Interview nr. 12, Human rights lawyer, 02.04.2014).  
 
One thing you’ve got to remember is that the government is extremely good 
at creating a sense of fear and panic, and undermining people. They only 
need to use one person and set it up as an example, and they’ve done that. 
Now, the people who are well known […], you know, they won’t be 
touched, because they have an international reputation, they are acknowl-
edged experts in their field. If they were going to touch somebody, they 
would take somebody small, scare the living daylight out of him or her, and 
probably then drop the case after 2,3 or 4 years of feeling that your phone is 
tapped and your computer watched and so on. And then, everybody in that 
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person’s field, it has exactly the effect that they want – it makes everybody 
fearful and self-censor.                    (Interview nr. 11, Publisher, 01.04.2014)     
 
Arrests often occur immediately after an article has been published or an expression has 
been made, meaning that the first sanction comes very quickly after the incident has taken 
place. This increases the chilling effect of the legislation. Few of the documented cases 
lead to conviction, but the immediate reaction by the police means that the sanction is felt 
almost immediately. MISA (Media Institute of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe) documented 
58 cases involving alleged violations on laws used against journalists and the media during 
the last couple of years, of which only 6 had resulted in convictions (MISA 2013:5-6). The 
police have also continued to apply Section 31 after the rulings of the Constitutional Court. 
On April 28 2014 a Newsday editor and reporter were detained by the police for an article 
that was published on April 24, and charged with violating Section 31 (NewsDay 2014b). 
Out of 64 documented cases of alleged violations of section 33 of the Criminal Code be-
tween 2010 and 2013, none of them had standing convictions by June 2013 (ZLHR:2013).  
 
As mentioned above, the general attorney decided to withdraw the charges against Owen 
Maseko when the constitutionality of the section was challenged by the Constitutional 
Court, and they have proceeded to withdraw charges in at least three other cases between 
January and April 2014, seemingly to avoid a final decision by the Constitutional court 
regarding the constitutionality of section 33. This indicates that the Zimbabwean authorities 
want to avoid that this piece of legislation is repealed, which again indicates that the legis-
lation is perceived to have the intended effect. Since the actual conviction rate on this sec-
tion is low, it can be argued that the intended effect of this legislation is in fact to avoid any 
critical comment about the President in day-to-day communication. I would argue that the 
chilling effect of this particular section is pervasive throughout Zimbabwean society. Peo-
ple are scared to mention even the smallest comment about the president in the presence of 
other people. It is also important to note that the President, with his legacy as a liberation 
hero and the founding father of Zimbabwe, has a very high standing among many Zimba-
bweans, and many people react very vehemently to any critical comment against him. 
Many of the section 33-cases are in fact reported by civilian bystanders such as work col-
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leagues (although it is impossible to know if any of them are in fact agents for the authori-
ties). The President himself has not commented on this piece of legislation publically 
(Mail&Guardian 2013). Interestingly, this legislation is not used against the media.   
 
You look at the papers today or any day, and you see cartoons of Robert 
Mugabe, half asleep in a little boat […], mocking him every day, and they 
don’t prosecute […] them. […] 
 
Newspapers don’t have a rural penetration at all, so 90 percent of the popula-
tion don’t ever see these newspapers. It’s the urban population, that they 
know that they don’t vote for ZANU-PF, so they leave them half of the time. 
It would cause a terrible stir if they started prosecuting people over cartoons 
being critical of the president, but individuals who are making comments…
   (Interview nr 8, Media expert/journalist 28.03.2014). 
 
Here we see that the geographical aspect is raised again; that the government is more con-
cerned about their reputation in rural districts. This does however not fully explain the dis-
crepancy in the application of section 31 and section 33 on the media, and the ‘margin of 
terror’ in rural versus urban areas. It is also interesting that the application of section 33 
increased during the joint government, as documented by ZLHR (2013). My data does not 
give me sufficient information to conclude on this, but it is a very interesting issue that 
warrants further studies.  
 
To sum up, we see that the consequences of the legislation goes beyond the court proce-
dures and legal sanctions, and it appears that the legislation is used consciously as a 
chilling factor by the authorities, even when there are no real legal grounds for applying it.  
 
You see, the real challenge is, it’s not necessarily us scoring victories in the 
courts. It’s then about what then after that. Very few people will want to do 
what Owen [Maseko] did, because the real tragedy is, you do it and you pay 
the price, at a personal level. Which is what the government then is good at. 
                                                         (Interview nr. 4, Musician, 26.03.2014)     
 
The last factor that I will look at is related to the willingness of violating the law. As I 
showed in chapter 2, people are more willing to violate a law that they consider unjust or 
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even unconstitutional. There was unanimity among my informants that the legislations of 
POSA, AIPPA and several sections of the Criminal Code were not legitimate and should be 
repealed. I noted a high sense of willingness to violate the laws due to them not being legit-
imate. Journalists and media practitioners have established or form part of several coali-
tions and organisations such as MISA-Zimbabwe, The Media Alliance of Zimbabwe, The 
Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists and Zimbabwe 
National Editors’ Forum (Zinef). These organisations are active and vocal in their criticism 
of the mentioned laws. This creates a strong social support for journalists and editors who 
violate the legislation. MISA-Zimbabwe also administers a Media Defense Fund, to help 
media practitioners cover legal fees related to violations of the laws. The strong social sup-
port among media practitioners is an enabling environment that reduces the deterring effect 
of the legislation.    
 
One last empirical test of the effect of legislation is to look at if the present and see whether 
the new Constitution and the Constitutional Court rulings is perceived as having an effect 
on media and artists. I would have expected more of the informants to make active refer-
ences to the new constitution or the recent rulings by the Constitutional Court regarding 
sections 31 and 33 of the Criminal Code, but among media and art practitioners this was 
not highlighted much. Whereas media activists and human rights lawyers were eager to talk 
about these changes, there was less optimism among the media and art practitioners that I 
talked to regarding the imminent changes that would follow from these recent develop-
ments. This would indicate that the legislation itself is not so important. However, I believe 
this to be closely linked to skepticism of the government’s willingness to abide by court 
rulings and the constitution. 
 
You must be aware of this: Here is a piece of legislation, here’s AIPPA. 
When the court rules against AIPPA or strikes off a section of AIPPA, that’s 
just one step. Because the legislation is administered by government. So the 
next step should be government taking that up and implementing the court 
ruling. They don't do it! […] The issue then in short: Here is a political lead-
ership which overrides everything and anything when push comes to shove. 
Basically, obtaining court rulings against the Mugabe regime is a waste of 
time.                                                   (Interview nr. 2, Journalist, 25.03.2014)   
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In conclusion, there is high willingness, especially in the independent media, to violate the 
legislation that is perceived as being illegitimate. This is probably strengthened by the joint 
efforts of organizations and coalitions. On the other hand, there is a strong feeling among 
the people I talked to that the legislation in itself was only half the picture: It all depends on 
the political will in the ZANU-PF and the government, and that will is perceived as being 
very small or non-existing. This interplay between legislation and lawlessness can be seen 
in an argument for why civil defamation legislation was to be preferred instead of criminal 
defamation: 
 
Unlike in the case of criminal defamation where state agents can use extra-
juridical measures to deal with journalists, which tends to scare a journalist 
before he even starts writing his story, you don’t have to face imprisonment 
there and then, it’s more or less like civil, as it says, you are summoned to 
come and go, and the hostility might be there, but not within the court pro-
cess, not within the prosecutional process, if I may call it that.  
(Interview nr 6, Editor/journalist, 27.03.2014) 
   
Summing up, we see that the deterring factors that are necessary for legislation to be com-
plied with are present to a large degree in the case of legislation affecting public expres-
sions in Zimbabwe. First of all, the legislation is known among the possible offenders, es-
pecially in the media. Also, the perceived costs of violating the legislation are quite high, 
caused inter alia by knowledge of previous reactions to others who have violated the legis-
lation. This increases the perceived probability of being detected. The possible sanctions 
are also quite high, both in terms of sentencing if found guilty (up to twenty years in prison 
for violations on Section 31) but also in the fear of extra-judicial sanctions such as the 
threat of violence. The fact that detention comes almost immediately after an expression 
has been made contributes to the chilling effect of the legislation. The chilling is also en-
hanced by the fear of sanctions affecting third parties, such as sources. 
 
On the other hand, there is much willingness to violate the law, especially among media 
practitioners, who perceive these pieces of legislation as being illegitimate and unconstitu-
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tional. This willingness is increased by the social support within the media and human 
rights community, which in turn should contribute to the legislation being less chilling. 
However, I find that this effect is being countered by the perception that the government 
will not respect the legislation or court rulings if it goes against them. This creates an un-
certainty; a ‘margin of terror’, that increases the chilling effect of the legislation, causing a 
fear that the legislation can be used against you even when you are in fact not violating it.  
 
4 Conclusion  
In this study I have looked at the effect that insult and defamation legislation has on public 
expressions by the media and artists. I have applied theories on the factors causing legisla-
tion to have a deterring effect to data gathered in personal interviews of Zimbabwean me-
dia and art practitioners, as well as human rights and media experts, in order to determine 
the actual chilling effect of the legislation.  
 
A law or rule is most effective when the law is known, the perceived costs are greater than 
the benefits and there is a high risk of detection of the violation. The likelihood of being 
detected (here: arrested or prosecuted), the severity of the sanctions and the time span be-
tween violation and reaction are factors that increase the perceived cost of a violation, 
thereby making the law more effective as a deterring factor. All these factors are present in 
the Zimbabwean case, making the legislation more deterring. The last factor that I looked 
at is the ability and willingness of the potential offender to act rationally and not violate the 
law. Here I have shown that there is in fact a high willingness among media practitioners to 
violate this legislation, which is considered illegitimate and unconstitutional. This indicates 
reduced effectiveness of the legislation. However, I have also shown that official practices 
such as immediate detention after an expression has been made, the use of violence or 
threats of violence either by police officials or unofficial groups, and the lack of trust in the 
government’s willingness to abide by the law, increase the deterring effect of the legisla-
tion and outweighs the social support. In short, the legislation in itself does have a real 
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chilling effect on public expressions; however it is the combination of the legislation with 
the (real or perceived) lawlessness that makes it freezing.  
 
The media and art practitioners apply multiple strategies to cope with the restrictive legisla-
tion. One is self-censorship, which is widely practiced and can take different forms. Other 
strategies include anonymity, the use of metaphors or multi-layered communication, spon-
taneous performances known as ‘guerrilla theatre’ and faceless online publications. The 
concern is that these avoidance strategies are contributing to the media being less profes-
sional and less ethical, which might in fact be the most corrosive unintended effect of the 
legislation.   
 
In order to ensure full freedom of expression in Zimbabwe, it is necessary to revise the ex-
isting pieces of legislation that I have looked at. The legislation has in fact a chilling effect 
that needs to be reduced. The combination of legislation with extra-judicial measures 
means that merely changing the laws is not sufficient. But it is a necessary start.  
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6 Annexes 
6.1 Section 31 of the Zimbabwe Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act 
31 Publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the State 
Any person who, whether inside or outside Zimbabwe— 
(a) publishes or communicates to any other person a statement which is wholly or material-
ly false with the intention or realising that there is a real risk or possibility 
of— 
(i) inciting or promoting public disorder or public violence or endangering public safety; or 
(ii) adversely affecting the defence or economic interests of Zimbabwe; or 
(iii) undermining public confidence in a law enforcement agency, the Prison Service or the 
Defence Forces of Zimbabwe; or 
(iv) interfering with, disrupting or interrupting any essential service; 
shall, whether or not the publication or communication results in a consequence referred to 
in subparagraph (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv); or 
(b) with or without the intention or realisation referred to in paragraph (a), publishes or 
communicates to any other person a statement which is wholly or materially false and 
which— 
(i) he or she knows to be false; or 
(ii) he or she does not have reasonable grounds for believing to be true; 
shall, if the publication or communication of the statement— 
A. promotes public disorder or public violence or endangers public safety; or 
B. adversely affects the defence or economic interests of Zimbabwe; or 
C. undermines public confidence in a law enforcement agency, the Prison Service or the 
Defence Forces of Zimbabwe; or 
D. interferes with, disrupts or interrupts any essential service; 
be guilty of publishing or communicating a false statement prejudicial to the State and lia-
ble to a fine up to or exceeding level fourteen or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
twenty years or both. 
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6.2 Section 33 of the Zimbabwe Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act  
33 Undermining authority of or insulting President 
(1) In this section— 
“publicly”, in relation to making a statement, means— 
(a) making the statement in a public place or any place to which the public or any section 
of the public have access; 
(b) publishing it in any printed or electronic medium for reception by the public; 
“statement” includes any act or gesture. 
 
(2) Any person who publicly, unlawfully and intentionally— 
(a) makes any statement about or concerning the President or an acting President with the 
knowledge or realising that there is a real risk or possibility that the statement is false and 
that it may— 
(i) engender feelings of hostility towards; or 
(ii) cause hatred, contempt or ridicule of; 
the President or an acting President, whether in person or in respect of the President’s  
office; or 
(b) makes any abusive, indecent or obscene statement about or concerning the President or 
an acting President, whether in respect of the President personally or the President’s office; 
shall be guilty of undermining the authority of or insulting the President and liable to a fine 
not exceeding level six or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both. 
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6.3 Section 96 of the Zimbabwe Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act  
Criminal defamation 
(1) Any person who, intending to harm the reputation of another person, publishes a 
statement which 
(a) when he or she published it, he or she knew was false in a material particular or realised 
that there was a real risk or possibility that it might be false in a material particular; and 
(b) causes serious harm to the reputation of that other person or creates a real risk or 
possibility of causing serious harm to that other person’s reputation; 
shall be guilty of criminal defamation and liable to a fine up to or exceeding level fourteen 
or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or both. 
(2) In deciding whether the publication of a statement has caused harm to a person’s 
reputation that is sufficiently serious to constitute the crime of criminal defamation, a court 
shall take into account the following factors in addition to any others that are relevant to the 
particular case 
(a) the extent to which the accused has persisted with the allegations made in the 
statement; 
(b) the extravagance of any allegations made in the statement; 
(c) the nature and extent of publication of the statement; 
(d) whether and to what extent the interests of the State or any community have been 
detrimentally affected by the publication. 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a person accused of criminal defamation arising out of the 
publication of a statement shall be entitled to avail himself or herself of any defence that 
would be available to him or her in civil proceedings for defamation arising out of the same 
publication of the same statement. 
(4) If it is proved in a prosecution for criminal defamation that the defamatory statement 
was made known to any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the 
person understood its defamatory significance. 
 
 
